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Housing and Interest Rates:
A Weaker Link?
The housing market historically has played a
central role in the u.s. business cycle. Since
housing investment is a significant component
of investment in the economy (about one-third
of total gross investment), cycles in housing
influence the overall business cycle directly.
In addition, housing investment traditionally has
been viewed as very interest sensitive and,
thereby, as an important channel through which
monetary policy can influence business cycles.
Financial deregulation and innovations in hous-
ing finance may have reduced the susceptibility
of the housing market to fluctuations in market
interest rates in recent years. This Letter discusses
the various channels through which interest rates
traditionally have influenced housing, and exam-
ines the data for changes in these relationships.
This analysis suggests that, indeed, the link has
weakened, and that this weakening is coincident
with the extensive financial deregulation that
occurred in the early 1980s.
User costs
There are a number of channels through which
interest rates may influence housing. A primary
channel is the effect of interest rates on what is
called the "user cost" of housing capital. The
user cost is simply the total, periodic cost faced
by owners of housing. It includes taxes,. mainte-
nance and depreciation costs, the foregone
earnings on the funds used to acquire the hous-
ing, and expected changes in the value of the
housing asset.
A change in the level of interest rates influences
the user cost of housing in two ways, depending
on whether it is the real or the inflation compo-
nent of nominal interest rates that changes. If a
rise in the real interest rate occurs, the effect on
housing is unambiguous: the opportunity cost of
funds invested in housing rises, and the conse-
quent rise in user costs de'presses dema-nd for
housing. This, in turn, depresses the price of
housing capital and the attractiveness of new
investment in housing.
If, on the other hand, the increase in interest
rates is the result of increased inflation expecta-
tions only (that is, nominal, but not real interest
rates change), the effect is less clear. An increase
in inflation expectations can actually lower the
user cost of housing capital, because the owner
anticipates tax-favored capital gains in the hous-
ing capital. Thus, although a rise in inflation
expectations causes the opportunity cost of funds
invested in housing to rise, it also causes the
after-tax return to housing investment to rise.
Everything else being equal, therefore, housing
demand and investment in housing may rise
when inflation expectations and thus, nominal
interest rates, rise.
Disintermediation
Another channel by which interest rates are
said to influence housing activity is through the
phenomenon of "disintermediation." Disinterme-
diation in this context refers to the tendency of
funds to flow away from conventional housing
lenders (such as thrifts and banks) when interest
rates rise suddenly. (See Chart 1.) Historically,
disintermediation occurred because the conven-
tional mortgage intermediaries faced restrictions
on their ability to pay depositrates that were
competitive with open-marketinvestment oppor-
tunities. In the past, when market interestrates
rose above the deposit rate ceilings, higher-yield
opportunities tended to attract funds away from
deposits, thereby reducing the funding available
to conventional housing lenders. A diminished
supply of mortgage credit, in turn, may have
reduced housing demand and investment.
While disintermediation may have contributed
to housing cycles, it is unlikely to have had an
adverse effect on housing activity over the long
run. In the longer run, the supply of housing
credit was not affected significantlyby disinter-
mediation since banks and thrifts were able to
attract funds by increasing the services offered
their depositors. This non-pecuniary form of
competition eventually tended to draw funds
back to the affected institutions. Moreover,FRBSF
increased investment in mortgage debt by other,
unaffected intermediaries helped to compensate
for the decline in lending by banks and thrifts.
too, may have helped to exaggerate the cyclical
relationship among interest rates, mortgage








A number of policy changes in the 1980s are
likely to have affected the relationship between
interest rates and housing investment. With the
passage of the Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) in
1980, depository institutions began to be able to
offer deposits at rates competitive with other
investment opportunities. Although this deregu-
lation occurred gradually, and was not complete
until sometime after the implementation of the
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act in
1983, iris clear that by 1983, a major reason
for disintermediation from housing lenders effec-
tively had been removed.
Chart 1
Disintermediation and Interest Rate Shocks
As the first chart indicates, the relatively regular,
traditional countercyclical relationship between
interest rates and deposit inflows became more
complicated after 1983. Indeed, statistical tests
do not find a consistent negative link between











Lenders have sought ways to overcome afforda-
bility constraints by such means as broadening
the definition of household income (to include
the income of a second wage earner) and by
emplbying alternative mortgage designs. The
adjustable-ratemortgage (ARM) is one such
innbvation.lt generally has initial payments that
arelowerthan those of fixed-rate mortgages,
making any given payment-tb-income test less
binding. Some fbrmsof ARMs affect payment
affordabilityby allbwingthe outstanding princi-
pal amount to fluctuate (a feature called "nega-
tive amortization"). The availability of such
ARMs at variouspointsinthe business cycle may
help bufferthe long-run effects of iriterestrate
shocks.
Given the slow way in which these standards
adjust,a sudden rise in interest rates could cause
borrbwers' ability to qualify for mortgage credit
to change suddenly as well. As a result, these
constraints may have contributed tb cycles in
housing investment. This is particularly true for
the fixed-rate, fully amortizing type of mortgage
instrument that has prevailed in the post-
Depression era.
Credit scoring and mortgage instruments
A final channel of influence is sometimes called
the "affordability" constraint. In qualifying bor-
rowers for mortgage loans, lenders employ credit
scoring, or loan qualificationstandards .. These
standards often impose limits on the relationship
between mortgage payment size and household
income, among other factors. These standards
change slowlY,driven by regulation, conventibns
of lenders, and standards imposed by secondary
mbrtgage markets.
The adjustable rate mortgage maybe influential
in another way. Borrowers may prefer ARMs over
fixed-rate instruments whenthey believe that
their own income is likely to fluctuate with
future interest rate movements. Until the early
1980s, however, lenders were restricted by reg-
ulation from offering ARMs. By limitingmortgage
instrumentation tothe fixedcrate instrument, the
mortgage market was what economists call "in-
complete;" itmay have been less able to match
borrowers' and lenders' needs efficiently when
those needs varied overthe business cycle. This,
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Barriers to mortgage innovation also fell in
the early 1980s. The Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, for example, first permittedthrifts to offer
ARMs on a widespread basis in 1981. Secondary
market acceptance ofthese instruments followed,
and soon most lenders were able to offer an al-
ternativemortgage to the traditional fixed-rate
instrument. Today, ARMs are common, and as
theory would suggest, their issuance varies
positively with peaks in the interest rate cycle.It seems likely that this confluence of regula-
tory events in the early 1980s altered the link
between interest rates and housing. Chart 2
suggests that the traditional, countercyclical
relationship between housing starts and the
deviation of interest rates from their trend has
diminished. More sophisticated statistical testing,
accounting for the possible influence of variables
in addition to interest rates, confirms that the
strength of the Iink after 1983 or so is less than
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Policy implications
Of course, many other factors also may be
responsible for the seemingly different cyclical
pattern displayed by housing. Tax policy changes
that occurred in the early 1980s and in 1986, for
example, affected both household borrowing
costs and the tax treatment of passive housing
investment. These changes may have altered
preferences for housing versus other assets.
Aggressive mortgage lending by weak thrifts also
may have introduced more strength in housing
investment than otherwise would have been
expected. Suggestive ofthis is the fact that the
relationship between S&Ls' funds flows and
housing investment has strengthened in recent
years. Unfortunately, insufficient data exist to
examine simultaneously all of these effects to
determine their relative importance.
In any event, it appears that the cyclical behavior
of housing activity, particularly in relation to
cycles in interest rates, has changed in the 1980s.
The experience of the last half-decade or so sug-
gests that the interest rate-housing channel of
influence for monetary policy may be less potent
than before. To the extent such a dampened rela-
tionship persists, this suggests that the economy
as a whole may tolerate somewhat larger interest
rate shocks without precipitating sharp changes




Banking and Regional Studies
MONETARY POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR 1989
On July 20, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan presented a mid-year report to
the Congress on the Federal Reserve's monetary policy objectives for the remainder of1989. The
report reviews economic and financial developments in 1989 and presents the economic out-
look heading into 1990. For single or multiple copies of the report, write to the Public
Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco,
CA 94120, or phone (415) 974-2246.
Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, or ofthe Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor (Barbara Bennett) or to the author•... Free copies of Federal Reserve
publications can be obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702,
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